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Abstract 
 
Competitive tendering is a popular mechanism for the provision of local bus services when a major 
objective is subsidy savings. Despite uncertainties in the legal framework some competitive tendering 
was implemented in Italy since 1998. The evidence so far is that participants were limited in number, the 
incumbents were almost everywhere able to gain the franchise, whilst subsidy savings were in many cases 
negligible. If some “political” conditions favouring more effective tendering procedures are not fulfilled, 
other regimes should be considered in order to obtain substantial subsidy savings. 
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1. Introduction 
 
In the last century many local bus companies in Italy (as in many European countries) 
enjoyed monopoly protection by means of non-tendered concessions or public 
ownership. The financial performance of these firms has deteriorated for more than 
thirty years. Financial distress is only partly explained by declining patronage (lower 
shares in the private – public transport split) and fares permanently lower than average 
costs. An important role is also played by low and stagnant productivity, due to weak 
incentives for efficiency. Weak incentives, in turn, are not surprisingly related to cost-
plus contracts, based on individual negotiations between local governments and the 
(local) monopoly firm. Incentives are even weaker when the firm is publicly owned and 
the local government can not credibly commit to let the firm go bankrupt in the 
presence of high and/or increasing deficits (Boycko, Shleifer and Vishny, 1996). 
Competitive tendering is held to be the most effective instrument to create 
competitive pressure in a market in which an open competition among firms is not 
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feasible or uneconomic (Demsetz, 1968). In Europe competitive tendering of transport 
services has been implemented in France, in Great Britain and in the Scandinavian 
countries. As summarised by Hensher and Wallis (2005), in fifteen years competitive 
tendering brought about a 50-55% reduction in real unit costs in London, whilst in 
Scandinavia there were savings ranging from 5 to 34%, but most in the range of 20-
30%1. 
The appraisal of the French experience casts some doubts on the efficiency enhancing 
properties of competitive tendering. It has been said that “competition has not been 
fostered and the performance indicators are still mediocre, not to mention the fact that 
collusion still exists” (Yvrande-Billon, 2005, p. 19). The French Competition 
Commission, in 2005 denounced the existence of a cartel between the three leading 
operators, who were alleged for explicit bidding coordination, leading to higher prices 
“than those that would have resulted from a competitive functioning of the market” 
(Yvrande-Billon, 2005, p. 15). 
In order to improve the allocative and productive efficiency of the local bus industry, 
the Italian government introduced a reform (D.lgs. 422/97 and 400/99) whose main 
purpose was to create a more market-oriented industry, enhance competition and reduce 
the huge amount of subsidies to the unprofitable local bus companies. In particular, the 
bill stated that non-tendered concessions were to be banned as of January 2004. By that 
date all subsidised local transport services (rail services included) would have been 
tendered off. Later legislative interventions changed the institutional framework, 
introducing normative uncertainty and leaving discretion to local governments whether 
tendering out concessions or making use of in house provision. Despite all these 
fluctuations in the legal rules, in some regions tenders did actually take place.  
The purpose of this paper is to assess the competitive tendering procedures in Italy 
and to point out the main difficulties that have so far hindered the process. The structure 
of the paper is as follows. In section 2 the most important issues that competitive 
tendering in the local bus industry rises are briefly examined. In section 3 a summary of 
the results of competitive tendering is presented - making use of the information we 
gathered and organised over the years – followed by a tentative assessment of those 
results. Section 4 concludes that, if some “political” conditions favouring more effective 
tendering procedures are not fulfilled, other regimes should be considered in order to 
obtain substantial subsidy savings.  
 
 
2. Relevant issues for competitive tendering  
 
As suggested by the recent economic literature (Klemperer, 2004), an efficient 
outcome of an award procedure depends on several factors, in particular on the number 
of participants, on the absence of barriers to entry and on the existence of widespread 
knowledge about the best production technologies. The implementation of a competitive 
tendering process in the bus industry is even more complex, as not only economic but 
also technical aspects of the services must be taken into account2. First, the local 
                                                 
1 See also Alexandersson, Folster, Hultén (1998); Kennedy (1998); Ramella (2001); Toner (2001); 
London Transport (2002); Alexandersson, Pyddoke (2003); Boitani, Cambini (2004a). 
2 Notice that, since local transport services are unprofitable at the present Italian level of fares and costs, 
the price that comes out of a competitive tendering normally consists of the remuneration that the winning 
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authority has to define the type of contract to be offered to the winning bidders. 
Following the analysis of Isotope (1997), there are two different types of on-going risks 
that a supplier of transport services has to face: the production risk, associated with the 
production cost of the services’ provision; and the revenue (or commercial) risk, 
associated with the sale of transport services. The allocation of these risks defines a set 
of different types of contracts that could be tendered: 
• Gross Cost Contract: the transport firm bears only the production risk while the 
revenue risk is born by the tendering authority. The firm receives a unit transfer related 
to an anticipated unit cost. Revenues accrue only to the tendering authority. 
• Net Cost Contract: both risks are born by the transport firm. It receives a transfer 
determined in the tendering process, equal to the difference between anticipated total 
costs and traffic revenues. 
There is a variety of incentive contracts between local authorities and the transport 
firm - such as gross cost contracts with revenue incentive, or net cost contracts with 
shared revenue risk - in which the revenue risk is split between actors. Different types of 
contract entail different incentives to minimize costs and/or to control revenues. 
Whatever type of contract has to be clearly specified ex ante when designing the 
tendering procedure. 
The size of the service-area is the second element that local governments should 
define in a tendering procedure. Ex ante costs and benefits of different alternatives are 
as follows (Cambini, Filippini, 2003): 
• Route-by-route tendering guarantees an efficient production of transport services, as 
the number of potential bidders can be expected to be high and competition can thus be 
expected to be fierce. However, route-by-route tendering could increase the planning-
costs of urban transport, since the local authority must coordinate a large set of services 
provided by different operators in order to have a well integrated network. This 
tendering procedure could more successfully be used to assign inter-city routes than 
urban ones. 
• Network tendering: implies that all services in an urban or even regional area are 
bunched together and tendered out. Although this method maintains the integrity of the 
network, it presents some disadvantages. The complexity of the services to be provided 
increases the organizational costs of the tendering procedure. Moreover, if one applies 
this procedure to allocate transport services in a large city or a metropolitan area, the 
potential number of bidders would be low. The lower the number of bidders the lower 
the potential benefits from the auction. 
• Sub-set tendering: the service-area to be tendered is divided into sub-set. Each sub-set 
is made of a bunch of routes to be served by the winning bidder. By reducing the area to 
be served one can expect that the number of potential bidders increases, hence that the 
competitive pressure also increases. In addition, the possibility of tendering small units, 
without loss of integration, permits the local authority to compare operators’ 
performance simultaneously (yardstick competition). The main difficulty with route 
bunching is defining the single units to be awarded and their size in order to exploit the 
economies of scale or density and to coordinate and correctly plan the services in the 
whole area.  
                                                                                                                                               
bidder requires to run the services and not a price to pay to get the rights to run the services. For a 
discussion on this issue see also Isotope (1997), Toner (2001) and Boitani, Cambini (2002). 
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Summing up, on the one hand, the definition of a small service area to be assigned, 
for instance a bus line, can guarantee a high level of competition because many 
operators will be able to participate in the tendering process. On the other hand, a small 
service area cannot guarantee the optimal scale of production3.  
There are other relevant aspects in the design of a tendering procedure. First, local 
Authorities should decide either to accurately design ex ante the assigned area (i.e. to 
implement a rigid tender) or to leave some degrees of freedom to the franchisee in 
designing the services, in terms of fares, frequencies of buses, bus routes, quality of 
buses, etc. (non rigid tender). In order to avoid a quality reduction in the provision of 
transport services, local authorities usually set penalties in case of unjustified reduction 
in quality provision. Third, the introduction of quality features in a tender procedure 
generates difficulties in evaluating the overall level of each bid. In this context, the 
selection criteria (i.e. the scoring system) must take into account both the economic and 
technical issues of service provision. While the economic elements can easily be 
quantified, problems of evaluation emerge in assessing quality. The possibility of 
assigning arbitrary weights to different elements of the bid could alter significantly the 
final result of the award process.  
Finally, it is extremely important how the ownership of buses, deposits and other 
equipment is allocated among competitors. The use of infrastructure represents a 
consistent barrier to entry that could prevent new operators from entering the market. If 
the tendering authority owns the infrastructure, then these barriers can be eliminated. 
Otherwise, the tendering authority must oblige the incumbent to transfer the entire 
infrastructure to the potential new operator, but it has to define how to evaluate the 
financial value of these capital goods. This last task is extremely complex due to the 
information asymmetry between the incumbent and the local authority.  
 
 
3. The Italian competitive bidding experience in the local bus industry: an 
overview 
 
In the last two decades of the twentieth century the Italian local public transport sector 
has been characterized by increasing costs, sky-rocketing deficits and a declining 
market share. Especially labour costs, which represent 2/3 of the total operating costs, 
have increased over years, while traffic revenues have remained stationary due to a 
combination of low fares (due to distributive concerns) and a consistent shift from 
public to private transport. Although fares have increased substantially since 1992, in 
2004 traffic revenues covered on average only 30% of total operating costs while the 
remaining costs were covered by public subsidies. A few economic indicators of the 
local bus industry in selected European countries can be found in Table 1. It can be seen 
that the Italian local bus industry has the second-highest unit cost (behind Germany), the 
highest unit labour cost and the second lowest labour productivity (behind Belgium). 
Although traffic revenues per km in Italy are not the lowest in Europe, the Italian local 
bus industry turns out to be the most heavily subsidised. 
 
 
                                                 
3 See for example Cambini, Filippini (2003) and Cambini, Piacenza, Vannoni (2006). 
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Table 1: Performance indicators of the local bus industry (average values 2002-2004). 
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(excluding 
Italy) 
Average 
(including 
Italy) 
Public 
subsidies per 
km (€) 
2,2 0,6 1,5 1,9 0,9 1,5 2,0 1,4 1,51 
Traffic 
revenues per 
km (€) 
1,08 1,49 2,39 1,14 1,07 0,98 1,00 1,34 1,30 
Operating 
osts per km 
(€) 
3,5 1,8 4,0 2,9 1,9 2,4 3,0 2,7 2,78 
Revenue/cost 
ratio % 30,7 84,2 60,5 39,2 55,4 40,0 33,1 52,1 49 
Standard 
ticket fare (€) 0,84 1,53 1,89 1,26 1,95 1,60 1,40 1,60 1,50 
1hour ticket 
in capital 
cities (€) 
0,80 1,13 0,97 1,32 1,76 1,44 1,33 1,33 1,25 
Monthly pass 
(€) 30,00 41,33 51,19 45,80 44,02 47,20 32,54 43,68 41.72 
Labour cost 
per km (€) 2,3 0,8 2,1 1,6 1,1 1,7 2,0 1,6 1,66 
Average 
product 
(Vehicle-km) 
per employee  
17060 20592 17761 20506 23423 18275 10018 19763 18233 
Source: Earchimede (2005). 
 
In some Italian regions competitive tendering procedures were planned in order to 
improve the poor cost performance of local bus companies and reduce public subsidies. 
Table 2 summarises the available information on the Italian tendering procedures, as of 
December 2005. In particular, Table 2 contains information on the contractual form, 
duration of the contracts, the size of the service area and the size of the area tendered, as 
a percentage of the total.  
Only four regions have tendered out more than 50% of total bus-km of the service-
area (Valle d’Aosta, Friuli Venezia Giulia, Lombardia and Toscana), while in Emilia 
Romagna only 34% of the total area was actually tendered out, but competitive 
tendering is still taking place in the residual area (Table 2). In Lombardia all the service-
area has been tendered out, except for the metropolitan area of Milan, that accounts for 
about bus-km 120 mln. In some southern regions (Sicily, Apulia, Sardinia and Calabria) 
competitive tendering of local bus service did not even start, whilst in other southern 
and central regions (Campania, Basilicata, Marche, Umbria) competitive tendering is 
slowly starting. In some northern regions, like Piemonte and Veneto, competitive 
tendering didn’t take place, except for a few isolated experiences. In all these areas, the 
normative uncertainty mentioned above and a good deal of political opportunism lead 
many local authorities to prefer the in house provision. 
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Table 2: Quantitative Analysis of the competitive tendering procedures in Italy (1998-2005). 
 
Regions Contractual 
Form 
Contract 
duration 
Total Bus-
km in 
regions 
(a) 
Bus-km in 
competition 
through 
bidding 
(b) 
% 
(b)/(a) 
Bus-km 
auctioned 
(c) 
% 
Total Bus-
km 
(c)/(a) 
% 
Vehicles-
km in 
competition 
(c)/(b) 
Valle 
d’Aosta Net cost 
6+3 
years 6.545.500 6.545.500 100% 6.545.500 100% 100% 
Liguria Net cost 6 +3 years 69.000.000 53.962.700 78% 14.962.700 22% 28% 
Piemonte Net cost 6 years 120.000.000 2.748.065 0,02% 2.748.065 0,02% 100% 
Lombardia Net cost 7 years 275.379.176 145.884.290 53% 139.307.896 50% 95% 
Veneto n.a. n.a. 131.549.005 252.000* 0,19% n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Friuli 
Venezia 
Giulia 
Net cost 10 years 41.596.000 41.596.000 100% 41.596.000 100% 100% 
Emilia 
Romagna 
Gross and 
Net cost 
From 2 
to 8 
years 
108.000.000 112.006.557 103% 37.181.176 34% 33% 
Toscana Net cost 5 years 117.000.000 120.965.842 103% 120.965.842 100% 100% 
Umbria Net cost 6 years 30.274.724 30.274.724 100% n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Marche n.a. n.a. 51.800.000 43.000.000 83% n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Lazio Gross cost 3 years n.a. 22.500.000 Additional services 22.500.000 n.a. 100% 
Campania  n.a. n.a. 158.000.000 2.490.642 1,57% 2.490.642 1,57% 100% 
Puglia  n.a. n.a. n.a. 33.072.549 n.a. 9.681.678 n.a. 29% 
Basilicata Net cost 5 years n.a. 28.000.000 n.a. 1.900.000 n.a. 6,79% 
*It refers to the urban area of Vicenza. No one had participated in the bidding procedure. The service is still offered 
by the incumbent. 
 
As for the contractual features of tendered services, it seems that net cost contracts are 
predominant, whilst the contract duration varies in different regions. Regarding the 
definition of the service-area, one can observe that a homogeneous criterion to define 
the size of the bus service area does not exist. In particular, the regional authorities 
normally choose the size of the service area by using the province or municipal 
jurisdictional boundaries, aggregating sometimes urban and inter-cities transport 
services, disregarding potential economies of scale and density. The design of 
competitive tendering procedures so far does not seem to give correct incentives to 
mergers of transport operators or at least to efficiently aggregate bunches of routes in 
nearby areas. Indeed, the Italian local transport market is still composed of a great 
number of small or even very small operators, contrary to what is going on in many EU 
countries, like Sweden and the UK. 
Tendering procedures in Italy do not generally regard single lines but large or small 
networks. In some cases, especially in small and medium-sized Italian provinces, urban 
and inter-city routes are bundled for tender, in order to let the winning firm cross-
subsidize the unprofitable urban services with the more profitable intercity services and 
thus reduce the subsidy to be given to the winning bidder4. 
In all the above-mentioned experiences, local governments maintain the ownership of 
infrastructures and buses. Tipically, these capital goods are given for free to the winning 
bidder but have to be returned to the local authority when the franchise expires. Finally, 
the competitive tendering was won almost everywhere by the incumbent operator, 
sometimes in joint venture with other local transport operators, with very limited 
savings with respect to the reserve price: 4% reduction on average in Val d’Aosta, and 
                                                 
4 The winner of the competitive tendering procedure is typically the company ready to offer a pre-defined 
transport service asking for the least amount of public subsidies. 
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3% in Friuli, while in other regions, like Lombardia, the reduction was even lower (1% 
on average) (Table 3). A special case is Tuscany. Here, the bidding procedures were 
designed with the objective of increasing the supply of transport services, and so the 
total bus-kilometers to be provided by the winning bidder. If the additional services 
offered in the tender by the winning bidders are taken into account, the average 
reduction in Tuscany reaches 4,3%. 
 
Table 3: Selected results of competitive bidding in Italy. 
Regions 
Average reduction for 
winning bids 
Ex post presence of Incumbent 
Valle d’Aosta 4% 100% 
Friuli Venezia Giulia 3% 100% 
Liguria n.d 75%* 
Lombardia 1% - urban areas: 90%* 
- suburban areas:  95,5% 
Emilia Romagna 0,5%** 100% 
Toscana 0,01% 100% 
*The bidding procedures in Como and Albenga, both won by new entrants, were revoked by the Regional 
Administrative Tribunal (TAR). 
** Only for the area for which official data are available 
Source: Boitani, Cambini (2004a); Cambini, Galleano (2005) 
 
The tendering procedures in Lazio deserve further explanations. These procedures 
actually refer to the case of Rome only, since no tendering procedures took place in 
other towns or provinces within that region. The early competitive tendering procedures 
organised in Rome were limited to additional transport services, consisting of new lines 
for the 2000 Jubilee (J routes) and of 15 additional million bus-km divided in two sets 
(8 and 7,5 million bus-km, respectively). A complete picture of the competitive 
tendering in Rome can be drawn from Table 4. These new routes integrate bus-km 115 
million provided, with a non-tendered concession, by the incumbent operator, the 
publicly owned Trambus. A joint venture - lead by Sita (owned by the national railways 
operator, Ferrovie dello Stato), with some local operators (Arpa - Chieti, Apm – 
Perugia) and the French company Transdev - was able to win all of the three early 
franchises.  
In the first and second tenders the incumbent operator, Trambus, was not allowed to 
make an offer in order to favour the entry of new transport operators. As can be seen in 
Table 4, this decreased the competitive pressure in the bid, leading to a reduction of 
approximately 8% of the reserve price. In the third tender, however, Trambus’s bid was 
admitted but the offer of the new entrant was better. In this last case, the reduction was 
25%, the highest reduction ever seen in Italy for whatever transport tendering 
procedure.  
The fourth tender contained a bundle of the previous additional services, plus some 
additional ones, for a total of 26,5 mln bus-km per year. Trambus was not admitted to 
the tender won by a new consortium of transport operators called “Tevere S.p.A”, once 
again led by Sita. The French operator Transdev didn’t take part in the consortium. The 
reserve price was € 2,37 per bus-km (gross cost), which was the actual transfer given in 
2005 (after allowing for RPI-indexation) to the previous operator and the winning bid 
was € 2,36 per bus-km: a tiny 0,42% reduction. 
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Table 4: Competitive tendering in Rome (additional services). 
Service area Bus-km 
per year 
(million) 
Annual 
value (Euro 
million) 
Compensation
per bus-km 
(Euro) 
Contract 
duration 
Contract 
form 
Reduction Winning 
operator 
Set 1: Jubilee 
lines (1999) 7 13.05 2,14 3 years 
Gross 
cost 8,0% 
New entrant 
in ATI: Sita, 
Atm 
Perugia, 
CIPAR 
Set 2: 
additional 
services 
(2000) 
8 17.04 2,13 3 years Gross cost 8,23% 
ATI: Sita, 
Apm, Arpa, 
Transdev, 
Star ,Cotri 
Set 3: 
additional 
services 
(2000) 
7.5 14.98 1,74 3 years Gross cost 25% 
ATI: Sita, 
Apm, Arpa, 
Transdev, 
Star ,Cotri 
Set 4: 
additional 
services 
(2005) 
26.5 62.54 2,36 3 years Gross cost 0,42% 
ATI: Sita, 
Apm, Arpa, 
Star, Cotri 
Source: Boitani, Cambini (2002); Atac (unpublished data). 
Figure 1 shows the compensation paid per bus-km varies widely across tendered 
areas. Such a variance is partly due to the fact that some contracts are gross cost (Lazio 
and some in Emila Romagna) whilst most of them are net cost (hence compensations 
are equal to subsidies). The variance may also be due to the service-mix effect and to 
many other differences in the type of service provided. However an average 
compensation of € 1,78 per bus-km in tendered services is more than 19% lower than 
the average compensation for both tendered and non tendered services (€ 2,2) reported 
in Table 1. 
 
 
Figure 1: Average compensation per bus*km (urban + inter cities services) 
Source: Cambini, Galleano (2005) 
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The compensations per bus-km in selected tendered areas of different regions are 
depicted in Figures 2 and 3. It turns out that the average compensation for urban 
services is higher than the one for intercity services due to the higher cost of urban 
transport (lower speed and higher traffic congestion). Comparing the data for some 
regions we can observe that the average compensation value in Lombardia for urban 
services is equal to € 1,91 per km, while it is equal to € 1,44 per km for inter-city 
services. The average for urban and inter-city services is equal to € 1,77 per bus-km, 
while in Toscana it is equal to € 1,71 and in Emilia Romagna € 1,97. Note that the value 
in Emilia is higher than the other ones because of the fact that in some areas of Emilia 
gross cost contract are in place, while in the other regions (except Lazio) only net cost 
contract are used. 
As for strictly urban services, Figure 2 shows a high variance in compensations, 
ranging from € 1,43 in Varese to € 2,60 in Crema. Whilst the high compensation in 
Sondrio may be explained by taking into account the high share of mountain-routes in 
the service-area, the same explanation does not fit for the case of Crema. The altimetry 
of the service-area may also serve as an explanation for the high compensations paid in 
Aosta 2 and Aosta 3 (which both encompass services in the mountain valleys of that 
area). However, the case of Naples stands out without any satisfactory explanation 
(Figure 3). 
 
 
Figure 2: Compensation for urban services in selected towns and cities. 
Note: Rome 1,2,3, gross cost contracts. 
Source: Cambini, Galleano (2005). 
 
It is fair to say that no definite pattern emerges from the available data. Competition 
through franchise bidding hasn’t lead yet to a convergence of the cost of local bus 
services towards some common value. The actual compensations paid by local 
authorities to the franchisees seem to be determined more by the past level of costs than 
by the levelling effect of competition. 
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When commenting on these results it should be considered that regional regulations 
require that, if an old operator is substituted by a new entrant, all the employees of the 
incumbent automatically become employees of the new franchisee on the same terms 
and conditions. Such “social clauses” may be justified because of the absence of any 
unemployment benefit for laid off workers in the Italian local transport industry. 
Nonetheless, it is difficult for a potential entrant to make a truly competitive bid when 
more than 60% of its cost (i.e. labour cost) is bound to be exactly the same as that of the 
incumbent and productivity is also bound to beclose to the one of the incumbent. The 
Italian Competition Commission denounced the anti-competitive nature of these “social 
clauses” and the results of the early tenders in Rome - where no “social clause” was 
imposed as the new entrants did not bite in the services of the incumbent – showed that 
competitive tendering tends to be more effective when less constraints are imposed on 
the participants. 
 
 
Figura 3: Compensation for inter-cities services in selected areas. 
Source: Cambini, Galleano (2005). 
 
It should also be observed that, in many cases, local governments failed to define 
precisely the service to be provided by the franchisee and retained large discretion as to 
the re-definition of the service to be provided5. The expected uncertainties may have 
discouraged some potential bidders and, due to the limited number of bidders, it is not 
surprising that the outcomes of competition are rather weak. Incumbent operators – 
mainly owned by local governments – not only had better information on the actual 
                                                 
5 This seems to be a feature shared with the unsatisfactory French experience mentioned above (Yvrande-
Billon, 2005). 
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state of the network and of the fleet but also had a lower “political risk” (Williamson, 
1976) as they could be confident that their shareholders would not let them go bankrupt 
in any unforeseen and unfavourable state of the world. Moreover, it has been observed 
(Boitani, Cambini, 2004a) that many tenders were “tailor-made” for the incumbents, i.e. 
that many local authorities designed the auctions in such a way as to put their own 
enterprises in an advantageous position. 
As a consequence of the above mentioned features of the awarding procedures, no 
foreign competitor dared to enter the market, except the French company Transdev, 
which joined other Italian operators in the early tenders in Rome. Recently Transdev 
decided not to participate in the new bidding procedure for services in Rome and bought 
a controlling share of Genova’s bus company. The British company Arriva chose to take 
over a private operator (Sab-Bergamo) in order to get hold of the market and 
institutional information of an Italian incumbent and, by doing so, to reduce its future 
bidding risks. Another consequence of the fact that the winners of the tendering 
procedures were almost everywhere the old local public operators is that no new Italian 
“player” grew up in the market so as to be able to take full advantage of scale and scope 
economies and to compete in Italy and abroad. 
 
 
4. Conclusions 
The definition of appropriate regulatory policies for unprofitable public utilities is a 
difficult task. As argued by Segal (1998), the incentive for unprofitable monopolistic 
firms, like a local public transport operator, to reduce its cost and increase revenue is 
low, particularly when the regulator has a reputation for bail out. In other words, if the 
regulator is benevolent, the firm tends to under-invest (i.e. reduce its effort) in order to 
become unprofitable and extract higher public subsidies. This is, in a nutshell, the soft 
budget constraint disease, the welfare losses of which are typically higher than the 
dead-weight cost of monopoly. 
Since Demsetz (1968) competitive tendering is viewed as a tool that local 
governments can use to benefit from the incentives towards efficiency entailed by ex 
ante competition. However Williamson (1976) and Goldberg (1976) warned that 
franchise bidding may be difficult to implement in practice and that potential gains from 
competition may be overcome by the burden of transaction costs that characterise 
inevitably incomplete contracts (Crocker, Masten, 1996). Many European local public 
transport services are now subject to competitive tendering. Some experiences (Sweden, 
Finland, UK) show that competitive tendering leads to lower costs and better service-
quality. The French experience turns out to be less positive.  
The Italian tendering experience in the bus industry is limited and does not allow to 
reach a definite conclusion; however in the previous sections it was argued that the 
results might have been far more encouraging if the tenders were organised in another 
way. We agree with Yvrande-Billon (2005, p. 20) when she points out that a 
disappointing experience “does not mean that this mechanism of coordination could not 
yield positive results and has to be abandoned” and that “competitive tendering cannot 
be beneficial if certain conditions are not respected”.  
With regard to the Italian experience the conditions to be fulfilled to have truly 
beneficial competitive tendering may be summarised as follows. The first and hardest 
condition is the willingness of local authorities to see their own firms thrown out of the 
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market if less efficient than potential entrants. This in turns depends on the willingness 
to give up political rents accruing from the ownership of local public enterprises. The 
national government may strengthen the “propensity to competition” of local authorities 
by setting appropriate financial sticks and carrots (Boitani, Tocci, 2005). The second 
condition is the extension of unemployment benefits to local transport workers, in order 
to drop those “social clauses” that are burdening all the Italian awarding procedures 
(Scarpa, Boitani, et al., 2005). The third condition is guaranteeing fair tenders, which 
implies that local authorities are not in charge of the procedure whenever their own 
company is allowed to make a bid. In such a case an independent agency should take up 
the task (Scarpa, Boitani, et al., 2005). This agency might also help local authorities in 
the definition of many technical aspects of the service, thus reducing post-contractual 
uncertainty and making bidding less risky. However the very existence of such an 
agency might not be popular with the local authorities, as some power would be taken 
away from them and transferred to the agency.  
If it were too hard to fulfil these conditions it seems reasonable to revert – at least as 
an interim measure - to a different route to strengthen the incentives of unprofitable 
local public buses, that is introducing a mechanism aimed at reducing the real value of 
subsidies over time: for short a subsidy cap (SC)6. Such a mechanism is indeed one of 
the provisions of the Italian 1997 reform, according to which public subsidies should 
not exceed 65% of operating costs and should decline over time in force of a cap 
explicitly aimed at increasing the X-efficiency of the industry. Despite the law, only few 
Italian local governments appear to have reverted to the SC. The same mechanism was 
introduced in Norway in a “menu” where also yardstick competition and competitive 
tendering were listed as alternatives to replace individual cost-plus negotiations. As 
documented by Dalen and Gómez-Lobo (2003) SC contracts rapidly outnumbered cost-
plus contracts and yardstick competition contracts and were able to deliver a yearly 
percentage cost reduction greater than the one delivered by tardistick competition and 
cost plus contracts. 
Performance based contracts advocated by Hensher and Houghton (2004) as an 
alternative to tendering in order to maximise some measure of the social surplus are 
more sophisticated than SC but also require well informed regulators and are difficult to 
implement. If the top ranking objective is subsidy savings, a SC contract may be 
regarded as a reasonable second best. 
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